A Watchdog for Byzantine Europe?

The Mysterious Document and Jack Straw's Panacea

by Kevin Ellul Bonici

There's this mysterious document doing the rounds in the European Union's elite quarters. It's in French, purportedly originating from the "Secretariat of the European Convention," and it is meaningfully entitled "Project Non-Paper: A Possible Draft of a Fundamental Treaty."

The document was exposed on August 25, 2002 in an interview Italian Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti gave to the Italian paper La Stampa (in Italian). The document, Tremonti says, came to him "by way of Anglo-Saxon paths" and it deals with a possible text for a federal European Constitution.

Byzantine federalism

Giulio Tremonti, representing the Italian government in the Convention on the 'Future of Europe', compares the mystique surrounding this secret document with the monastic intrigues of the Dark Ages.

"To me it seems like the type of intrigue that one finds in [Umberto Eco's] The Name of the Rose. One recalls that in the convent there is this mysterious place, indicated by esoteric formulas – finis Africae, hic sunt leones – that hides an equally mysterious document. The intrigue develops around the availability (accessibility) and the authenticity of the text.

"The history behind this document is perhaps less dramatic, but it is very similar. It is not on the Convention's official website, but it circulates within academic circles in mysterious ways. The document is 'likely real' (verosimile) in the literal sense of being 'like the real one' (simile al vero): technically unexceptionable, but graphically authentic."

Tremonti sarcastically notes that the document cannot be authentic since the Convention is all about transparency and it would have surely been placed on the website. Indeed, what is popularly known as the 'Convention on the Future of Europe' is supposedly a manifestation of democratic participation and transparency. Launched amid much fanfare last March, it aims to prepare a draft Constitution for the future European Union by 2003, to be agreed by the next EU Inter-Governmental Conference in 2004.

The document is divided into two parts. The first part relates to a 'fundamental treaty' (the Constitution), while the second part concerns the linkage with other European Union treaties. Of particular interest, says Giulio Tremonti, are the 11 points listed in the first part:

  • legal personality
  • goals and fundamental principles of the union
  • competencies (that is, what measure of 'subsidiarity' – devolved power – should Member States retain)
  • citizenship
  • institutional dispositions
  • decision-making procedures and legal instruments
  • jurisdictional control
  • budgetary and financial dispositions
  • internal and foreign agreements
  • enhanced cooperation (which is eurospeak for deeper integration)
  • general and final decisions
  • Tremonti gives no details but categorizes the federalist wording of the document to the school subscribed by Giuliano Amato, the vice-president of the Convention. "The tendency is not towards a Union of Nation States, but towards the creation of a single State," he warns. "Brussels as Washington. Paris as a province."

    The EU Convention, set in motion by the December 2001 Laeken Declaration, had been spawned by the Treaty of Nice in 2000. Tremonti doesn't see the Treaty of Nice as simply 'an enlargement treaty', as it is popularly referred to. He emphasizes that the Nice Treaty prevails over "the principles of national Constitutions," yielding an institutional framework where all decisions are taken by majority voting, which "means the total eradication of the sovereignty of the individual States."

    He adds:

    "The technique used is that of shattering (frantumazione) the democratic process, which is applied across a multiplication of decision-making points: States, governments, EU Commission, EU Authorities, European Parliament, all in play; formally geared and destined to function like clockwork – politically a model in which everybody counts and therefore no body counts. This is the effect of this shattering, which requires the arbitration of a technocracy. It yields a democracy that is paralyzed by an excess of complexity. This reminds me of Byzantium and the 'quasi' [almost, nearly, pseudo]."

    Tremonti explains that as these Byzantine decision-making processes are applied across a European single State, democracy is shortcut by a complex, hierarchical, federal circuit, of which "quasi States, quasi governments and quasi parliaments" form a part.

    A god of a higher order

    Giulio Tremonti, one must note, is of a rare political breed. You don't find many EU-critics on the mainstream euro-bandwagon, especially government ministers. And every EU-critical argument from such high offices warrants a counter-argument. So out comes Marco Follini, the leader of the centre-right House of Liberty (the word 'Party' is not trendy in Italy nowadays). Follini, representing the Italian parliament at the Convention, was interviewed for the following day's edition of La Stampa (in Italian).

    "This idea of an esoteric Europe is mistaken," he said. "I wish to kindly advice Tremonti that Europe is not the backdrop of some Eco romance-thriller. It is not the re-edition of the Byzantine Empire. It is not a sort of spectre to be cautious of: it is an extraordinary opportunity to look out for, instead, with confidence."

    If the EU project is an opportunity, then it's an opportunity for centralizationists to build a monolith for their own good. The builders of Europe form part of the system they build; a system that entraps them into creating fortified institutional towers high above the masses – institutions that share similar characteristics with medieval fiefdoms within a Kingdom. The EU is also an opportunity for romantics who are disillusioned with the mediocre workings of their governments, especially in applicant countries, where euro-glitter runs amiss. So instead of searching for devolution of power from within, they seek a god of a higher order: a far-removed supranational entity. This is the Hobbesian 'clockwork State' that reminds Tremonti of Byzantium.

    "With confidence," therefore, we are to look forward to the building of a huge motherland that will protect us from life's calamities and secure our bread and circus – the whole "future 500-million" massive herd.

    But then Follini comes to the crux of anything that's got to do with the 'Future of Europe' nowadays. And that's subsidiarity. He remarks:

    "…in Tremonti's reasoning there is another critical lapse: subsidiarity, the cornerstone of European construction, is missing. As [German chancellor candidate Edmund] Stoiber said: centralize where necessary, delegate every time this is possible."

    Funny how most Europeans accept the doctrine of euro- subsidiarity at face value, as if the EU is all about 'devolving decision-making powers to the lowest possible levels.' Listening to romantic europhile conceptions of subsidiarity you'd think it goes down to the libertarian level of individual sovereignty – unless, that is, you check for yourself what EU subsidiarity is all about and find that the complete opposite is the truth.

    A definition of euro-subsidiarity is provided by the European Convention website itself:

    "The principle of subsidiarity is that — except in areas where it has exclusive competence — the Union should only act when its action is more effective than action at national, regional or local level."

    This piece is a gem for critical-analysis purposes. To start with, the word 'only' is not just superfluous it is also highly deceptive, meant solely to please the mind. Also note the pervasive 'exclusive zone' – a zone that is gradually and surreptitiously widening. Otherwise, the principle of subsidiarity is not about devolution but about euro-active control. It is a one-sided-action principle that speaks of the Union's prerogative to act "when its action is more effective." When one considers the elasticity that can be applied to the interpretation of what's "more effective," one understands why the wording is different from its popular version of 'devolving decision-making powers to the lowest possible levels.'

    Would it have made any difference had this definition been more appropriately worded? Hardly. Euro-subsidiary is what it is and not what they say it is. Euro-subsidiarity will self-servingly take the form that befits it in the circumstances over European times to come.

    A "subsidiarity watchdog" over federalized Byzantine order

    So how do you stop a self-consolidating supranational entity from taking over further competencies from weakened Member States under its control? How do you control a political behemoth that rules over your means?

    For every problem there's a solution, they say. And this time the solution is provided by the Anglo-Saxon, eurosceptic-turned-eurobsessed New Labour philosophy: you appoint a people's watchdog, teach it the Rules of the Game, and unleash it on the federal version of Byzantium.

    Now, I've always considered the Anglo-Saxons to be eloquent control freaks, so this was no surprise. But to control a supranational behemoth is something the British have never had occasion to attempt.

    Consider this excerpt from British foreign minister Jack Straw's speech at Edinburgh on August, 27, and note how the eloquent British technique requires no lies:

    "…we need to strengthen the principle of subsidiarity – the idea that decisions should be taken at the lowest level consistent with effective action within a political system.

    "The Maastricht Treaty introduced a subsidiarity clause into the Treaty of Rome 10 years ago. This should have given a major fillip to efforts to democratise the Union's decision making process. But the lack of an enforcement mechanism for subsidiarity has meant that the principle can be ignored. It's akin to passing criminal legislation whilst forgetting to establish a police force.

    "I am calling for the creation of a new Subsidiarity Watchdog to ensure subsidiarity becomes a two way street. This should comprise MPs from all member states, and have the powers to monitor unjustified EU legislation. This body would help Europeans to hack their way through the undergrowth of local, national and supranational jurisdiction. And it would ensure that decisions were taken at the most effective level."

    Note that Jack Straw is recognizing the need for a 'people's' political force to counteract against oppressive forces that might come from the ruling EU body – quite similar in concept to the peoples' grievous representations before their Monarch prior to the advent of modern republics and democracies.

    When the British government initially proposed the 'subsidiarity watchdog' on July 22, 2002, the minister for Europe Peter Hain had adopted a more belligerent tone against "creeping federalism," no doubt reflecting mounting euroscepticism in Britain:

    "A committee of national parliamentarians, with powers to make the Commission and Council of Ministers think again when they were over-legislating, would make a real contribution to democratic legitimacy. To combat the sense that European institutions are arrogating more and more power to themselves."

    So this is an official recognition that the European Union is infected with that nasty phenomenon which afflicts federations that thrive on self-empowerment. Question is, can a parliamentary watchdog-committee be effective over a huge federal entity whose increasing means of self-empowerment can only be of a self-serving nature in line with its general aim of self-consolidation?

    This 'self-consolidation' factor is crucial. The future so-called 'United States of Europe' can only come to fruition if the gathered momentum is sustained. Self-consolidation and self- empowerment are the tools by which the euro-behemoth survives and thrives. What we'll essentially have in a subsidiarity watchdog is an inter-state parliamentary committee that is entrusted to control the momentum of a self-serving process geared at empowering the political body that rules over the institutional means of that committee.

    That's the stuff history is made of: the 'rule of law' as conditioned by the 'rule of power'. It repeats itself, yet that past sameness we seek to re-interpret is repeated in a way that is only recognizable when it too fades into history. But if one cannot predict the future, one can at least attempt to recognize the present and sense its directional trends.

    Big State, small citizen

    So what is going on in the evolution of this Europa Unita project? What brand of federalism does the EU necessitate in order to proceed towards effective unity?

    Comparisons may help. In a comment to my recent article A Dissenter's Fate in Fascist America, the Swiss coordinator of democracy-europe (a Direct Democracy e-forum), mused that "the story… (relating to repression in the US) looks like some old western tale, a movie taking you to a fantasy which few Europeans can grasp as being real. Is that tale misdated? Would not 18th century be more appropriate? Nothing to do with… the Swiss federation we live in."

    I agreed that Switzerland's brand of federalism is different from that found in the US. Switzerland is a devolved confederation, while the US brand of federalism is one of centralization and self-consolidation that moves towards stronger central government. So whereas the Swiss confederation is an alliance of 25 tiny cantons each enjoying a degree of autonomous direct-democracy as a means towards devolution of power, US federalism has been a means towards centralization of power. It is this American brand of federalism that the EU is applying. The European Union is not a devolving State but a State in the making. Today, and in the foreseeable future, the EU is and will be a State in the process of consolidation.

    A determinant factor here is population size. Whereas Switzerland's population is just over 7 million, the population of an enlarged EU is expected to reach 500 million. The consolidating political force required to hold such a vast population within a federal State necessitates a process that manifests a very high degree of centralized power. No watchdog can influence this process in the longer term, let alone control it. On paper, a utopian federation is perceivable, but in practice the gravitational forces maintained by self-empowerment would be harder for the people to control than in smaller States. Even if, theoretically, direct-democracy (a people's watchdog in the literal sense) were to be introduced across a federal EU, the problem of freedom is only exacerbated as the massive majority of punitive millions would overwhelm the needs and principles of the multitudes that lie across a fragmented minority. This is the outcome of a federal regime with a common governing body, a common legislative and executive body, and a common criminal justice system, wholly ruling over a common political body of EU citizenry.

    Tiny States can be very free unless a despot could possibly take over. In this context, an interdependent-alliance of free States is useful as a protection against repression, aggression and other catastrophes. This is not a union that hegemonizes laws in order to rule over the people through the services of its member-states (the State as a serving tool), but an alliance based on a collegial model aimed at safeguarding individual rights and freedom within that alliance (the State as a free partner among equals). As soon as an alliance is given a political character with an institutional body and supranational powers of control over the citizens within the alliance, then the process of self- empowerment and self-consolidation sets in, snowballing as further momentum is gained.

    Europa Unita has a life of its own. Fearing no puny watchdogs, it grows and it strengthens itself as best it can. All it needs now is a certificate that would confirm its right to live on as a State. With a federal Constitution the European Union would be granted that certificate, sealing its right for Statehood and its authority over European subjects, while fully legitimizing the process of self-consolidation.

    And as a huge State, it will also have the right to seek and deal with its own specific enemies.


    Kevin Ellul Bonici is co-editor of European MONITOR in Malta. Email: euobserver@onvol.net.

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    from The Laissez Faire Electronic Times, Vol 1, No 30, September 9, 2002
    Editor: Emile Zola     Publisher: http://orlingrabbe.com/